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Abstract 
This paper presents a Bayesian framework for 
assessing the adequacy of a model without the 
necessity of explicitly enumerating a specific 
alternate model. A test statistic is developed for 
tracking the performance of the model across 
repeated problem instances. Asymptotic methods 
are used to derive an approximate distribution for 
�he. t�st statistic. When the model is rejected, the mdtvtdual components of the test statistic can be 
used to guide search for an alternate model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Bayesian methods have been gaining in popularity 
a��n� researchers across a broad variety of 
dtsctphnes concerned with the problem of reasoning 
under u _ncertainty. Bayesian theory can account for 
many tmportant aspects of human scientific 
reasoning, includir:tg Occam's razor and the ability to 
make causal mferences without explicit 
randomization (e.g., Howsen and Urbach, 1989; 
Jef�rey� and Berger, 1992). Bayesian theory gives a 
�ahsfymg acc�unt of the process by which evidence 
ts used to revtse one's degrees of belief in a set of 
explicit.l� enumerated hypotheses, given a joint p�obabtl�ty model on evidence and hypotheses. 
Hterarchical Bayesian models permit the use of data 
t? revise beliefs about which of class of models gave 
ns� to tl�e data. But there are two essential aspects 
of mtelhgent reasoning under uncertainty which 
standard accounts of Bayesian theory fail to handle. 
Whi�e
. 
Bayes' Theorem tells us how to compare 
expliCitly .
en�merated hypotheses in the light of 
evtdence, tt gtves no gutdance on enumerating new 
hypotheses a�d provides no mechanism for rejecting 
an hyp?thests without an explicitly enumerated 
altern�t�ve. Both these capabilities are essential to 
the abthty to reason flexibly on high-dimensional 
p_roblems �or whic� .it is imp�actical to specify a 
smgle, stahc probabthty model m advance of seeing 
any data. 
T�is pa.f?er focuses on the problem of model failure 
dtagnosts. Several authors have proposed heuristic 
approaches to model failure diagnosis (e.g., Jensen, 
et al., 1990; Habbema, 1976). Laskey (1991) 
suggested that the agent construct artificial "straw 
models" as foils against which to compare the 
current model. But no guidance is given on how to 
select the straw model, and no distributional theory 
for the resulting test statistic is available. Other 
authors (Herskovits and Cooper, 1990; Laskey, 1992; 
Pearl, 1991) suggest sequentially generating a 
sequence of models and selecting the best according 
to some goodness criterion. For Laskey, the best 
model has the highest posterior probability. 
Herskovits and Cooper select models based on 
e':ltr�py .. Pearl assumes the complete probability distnbuhon (at least the complete conditional 
mdependence structure) is known and selects the 
simplest model which satisfies the conditional 
independen�� constraints.. These approaches all 
requtre expliCitly enumeratmg a comparison model 
before dropping the current one. 
2 HYPOTHESIS TESTS AND THE 
BOUNDED BAYESIAN 
Classical statistics has developed a number of 
procedures f�r model �ai�ure diagnosis, including 
goodness-of-fit test stahshcs and heuristic methods 
for ?etecting o
.
utliers. In the classical hypothesis 
test�n� paradigm, one postulates a family of 
stahshcal models, one of which is assumed to have 
given rise to the data. Some subfamily of this family 
of model� is singled out as the null hypothesis (the 
hypothesis to be assumed unless the data discredit 
it). A test statistic is developed whose distribution is 
known, at least approximately, under the null 
hypothesis. Prior to observing the data one 
specifies a range within which it is highly pr�bable 
that this test statistic will fall. If the observed value 
of the test statistic falls outside the range, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The level of the test is the 
probability that one will reject a true null hypothesis 
(� Type I erro,r) . The pou:er of the test against a 
given �lter�ahve hypothesiS is the probability that 
one WJI1 reJect the null hypothesis if the alternative 
hypothesis is true (no Type II error). 
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Bayesian statisticians have criticized classical 
statistical methods because their use leads to 
incoherence (violation of the axioms of subjective 
expected utility theory) and because the conclusions 
one can draw from a classical hypothesis test are not 
those needed for decision making. Decision makers 
generally are interested in how strongly one should 
believe the null hypothesis relative to the alternative 
hypothesis. Classical tests do not directly answer 
this question. A classical hypothesis test reports the 
a priori probability (before seeing the observed value 
of the test statistic) under the null hypothesis that a 
value as extreme as the actual observation would 
occur. An extreme observation is interpreted as 
casting doubt on the null hypothesis, but no 
inference about actual degrees of belief in null or 
alternative hypothesis is warranted. 
Bayesian inference methods do answer the decision 
maker's question -- they report degrees of belief in 
the null hypothesis conditional on the observed 
value of the test statistic. Many classical methods 
can be interpreted as approximate Bayesian methods 
when the sample is sufficiently large that the data 
swamp the prior distribution. Thus, Bayesian 
statisticians often use classical methods, although 
they regard the classical interpretation of the results 
as incorrect. But unlike classical methods, Bayesian 
methods require explicit computation of the 
likelihood of the data under the alternative models 
and a probability distribution for the current and 
alternative models. 
The approach I propose below is suggestive of a 
classical hypothesis test, but my interpretation is 
neither classical nor traditional Bayesian. The 
traditional Bayesian has nothing to say about a 
problem in which one cannot explicitly enumerate 
and compute data likelihoods and a prior 
distribution for one's alternate hypothesis. But the 
classical statistician eschews the subjectivist 
interpretation of probability, which is the 
interpretation I take in this paper. 
The ultimate goal of the research program of which 
this paper is a part is a theory of robust approximate 
Bayesian inference on problems in which explicit 
enumeration and computation of a fully adequate 
probability model is impractical or impossible. At 
any given time, the agent reasons within an 
approximate "small world" model (which may or 
may not be explicitly Bayesian). This model is 
believed at the time it is adopted to be an adequate 
approximation to a "larger world" model which 
more fully represents the agent's beliefs. The role of 
a test statistic is to serve as a computationally simple 
measure of the adequacy of the approximation. 
Such a test statistic can serve to alert a system that it 
needs to devote more resources to explicit 
enumeration of alternate models, to suggest 
directions for model search, or to trigger a system to 
turn to a human operator for assistance. 
There is an explicitly Bayesian interpretation of the 
model failure diagnosis approach I propose. In this 
view, the agent's current model is viewed as an 
approximation to a probability distribution over a 
family of models. This full probability distribution 
is too complex to be computed explicitly. Given 
repeated observations, the Central Limit Theorem 
can be used to derive an approximate distribution 
for the test statistic for any model in the family. This 
enables an approximate meta-level Bayesian analysis 
of the adequacy of the current model. 
3 A TEST STATISTIC 
Let X J, ... Xn be a sample from a t-dimensional 
multinomial distribution with parameters 1 and Jt. 
That is, each Xi is a vector of t-1 zeros and a single 1, 
with the probability of a 1 in the ith r,osition equal to 
Jti· The current model for t 1e probability 
distribution of the Xi is that they are independent 
and identically distributed with probability equal to 
a fixed vector p. The goal is to evaluate the 
adequacy of p as an approximation to Jt. I assume 
that all components of both p and :rr are strictly 
greater than zero. 
This situation arises in many current applications of 
Bayesian models to expert systems. In these models, 
Xi indicates which cell in a cross-classified table the 
ith observation falls into. The current model p is 
estimated by eliciting from an expert a network 
encoding independence assumptions among the 
classifying variables and conditional probability 
distributions of variables given their neighbors (a 
Bayesian network). The probability vector p may 
also be fixed in advance when the probability values 
are estimated from a sample different from the one 
used to evaluate the model. 
Define the random variables Y i as follows: 
(1) 
The variables Y i are independent and identically 
distributed with mean 
t 
E[Y i ] = J.1. = � nklog(pk) . 
H 
(2) 
If p=;t, the mean of Yi is equal to 
' 
J.l.. = � n. log(n,) . (3) 
The quantity �t :�r is called the entropy of the 
distribution n. TheY i are called the logarithmic scores 
of the data Xi under the model p. The logarithmic 
score is a strictly proper scoring rule -- that is, the 
score is maximized by setting p equal to the correct 
probability distribution Jt. The difference ll1t - f..1,. 
which is always positive, is often used as a measure 
of the distance between the probability distributions 
p and :1t. 
One could estimate (3) by the entropy ll p of the 
distribution p, which is obtained by replacing Jtk by 
Pk in (3). An efficient algorithm for computing llp in 
Bayesian networks is given by Herskovits and 
Cooper (1990). 
The Central Limit Theorem states that the sample 
mean of a sample of independent and identically 
distributed random variables approximates a normal 
distribution as the sample size becomes large. That 
is, 
Z = .rn y- 11 � N(O, 1) (4) 
a 
where a is the standard deviation of the Y i and the 
symbol � denotes convergence in distribution. 
Exact computation of the standard deviation a is 
much less tractable than computation of 1-1, but its 
value can be estimated by the sample standard 
deviation. A classical confidenc!'! interval for ll is 
given by: 
(5) 
where S is the sample standard deviation and Za is 
the ath percentage point of the normal distribution. 
The interval (5) can also be interpreted as an 
approximate posterior credible interval for the 
unknown value of 1-1, assuming a prior dist!_ibution 
for ll that is reasonably flat in the vicinity of Y. 
The model failure test statistic W is defined by 
w = IV- llpl 
S I ./D. (6) 
A model failure test based on W calls the model into 
question when (6) is greater than �t for some 
specified a (that is, when flp falls outside the 
credible interval for !!). For a log-linear model such 
as a Bayesian network, tests based on W can detect 
incorrect estimates of the sufficient statistics of the 
model (the joint probability distribution for each 
node and its parents) but cannot detect incorrect 
model structure. That is, when p is estimated by 
maximum likelihood or an asymptotically 
equivalent method (as, for example, in Herskovits 
and Cooper, 1990), the mean (2) converges in 
probability to the entropy llp whether or not the 
model is correct. 
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4 DETECTING INCORRECT 
STRUCTURE 
To test for incorrect model structure, I develop a test 
based on the conditional entropy. Assume that the 
observations Xi are cross-classified on a set of s 
variables: Xi = (Q1i, ... Oqi ), where Ori denotes the 
value for the rth classification variable on 
observation i (the Qr are the nodes in the Bayesian 
network). The total number of categories t is then 
equal to t1· .. t51 where tr is the number of possible 
values for classification variable r. 
Let (pI qr) denote the conditional distribution of the 
Xi given that Or= qr. Denote the entropy of this 
dis�ribution by !lp 1 qr· For those i for which Qri=qr, 
defme 
yilq, = 2 xiklog((plqr)k) (7) 
k 
the logarithmic score under the condition al 
distribution given_ Ori = qr. Exactly as above, the 
sample average Y i 1 � is asymptotically normally 
distributed (where the sample mean and standard 
deviation are taken over values for which Yi 1 q is 
defined), and a test statistic W q can be constructed 
in analogy to (6). 
r 
This statistic Wqr can be used to test model structure. 
One would not expect the conditional logarithmic 
score under (pI CJr) to converge to the conditional 
entropy 1-1 p 1 q when there a r e  condi tiona) 
dependencies 1�wolving the node Qr that are not 
represented in the distribution (pI qr). 
The conditional entropy can be computed fairly 
easily. In the Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter algorithm 
as described in Neapolitan (1990), evidence Or=qr is 
absorbed into an existing clique tree by creating a 
new clique tree without the node Or and setting 
clique potentials in the new clique tree to values 
from the original clique tree corresponding to Or=qr. 
The conditional entropy is just the entropy of this 
modified clique tree. 
A test statistic based on (7) can be computed for each 
cross-classifying variable Or. I have derived an 
asymptotic distribution only for the marginal 
distribution of each test statistic. The full joint 
distribution would be difficult to derive. Thus, only 
variable-by-variable intervals are available, not a 
credible region within which the vector of expected 
scores is be expected to fall. It should be noted that 
when there is a large number of cross-classifying 
variables, one would expect some of the tests to 
suggest model failure even when the model is 
correct. Nevertheless, the pattern of values of the 
W q can serve as a useful heuristic indicator of 
pot�ntial problems with the model. 
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When model failure diagnosis is to be used to trigger 
search for alternate models, values of the vector of 
test statistics can �e used to guide search. If the test 
statistic based on Yi 1 q. exceeds its threshold, this can 
serve as an indicator lhat a new arc may be needed 
between node Qr and some other node. 
5 INCOMPLETE DATA 
In many applications, it is important to be able to 
diagnose model failure from incomplete data. In 
applications of Bayesian networks to expert systems, 
one usually observes only some of the variables and 
the goal is to infer marginal probabilities for the 
other variables given values for the observed 
variables. It is important to be able to diagnose 
model inadequacy from such incomplete data. 
As before, let Xi denote the ith observation, but 
assume that only some of the Qri are observed. Let 
Xi denote the complete (unobserved) data. Define 
t 
v; = 6x;klog(pk); 
(8) 
Y; =E[Y; IXj]. 
The Y i are independent with mean !!· When the 
same variables are observed for all cases, the Y i are 
also identically distributed, and the theory 
developed above applies. When different data 
patterns are observed for different cases, the 
standard deviation of Y i differs with i, and 
distributional theory for W or W p 1 qr is not available. 
Nevertheless, these statistics could still serve as 
useful heuristic indicators. Because of the additive 
decomposition of log(pk), computation of Yi can be 
performed by a minor modification of the Lauritzen 
and Spiegelhalter algorithm. 
6 DISCUSSION 
A set of test statistics for diagnosing model 
inadequacy was developed. When a sample of 
observations is available and data are complete, an 
approximate posterior credible interval for each test 
statistic can be derived. When data are incomplete, 
the expected value of the test statistics can be 
computed. 
Extreme values of the test statistics can be used to 
initiate search for an alternate model. In addition, 
the pattern of which statistics exceed threshold can 
be used to guide search for an alternate model. 
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